Introduction
The modern-day impact of cultural and religious diversity comes to the fore in a recent publication by Hart Publishing, viz. "Managing Family Justice in Diverse
Societies" (hereafter "Managing Family Justice"). The "management" of family justice in diverse cultural and religious societies remains a highly topical and vibrant theme. Formerly homogenous societies are increasingly diversifying as a result of globalisation, especially in Europe, where governments are progressively faced with the challenges migrant cultural and religious groups pose to existing legal frameworks. Contrariwise, to assume that historically diverse communities know all the answers because of their exposure to cultural and religious differences over a longer period of time is a misconception.
The failure of many governments to effectively "manage" family justice in diverse societies is testament to the fact that existing policies and legal frameworks do not necessarily work. There is no one size that fits all, and it is necessary to explore "what response the law has or should have to different family practices arising from cultural and religious beliefs" by discussing "management" strategies from a legal viewpoint in various jurisdictions.
This is indeed what the authors of Managing
Family Justice purport to do. They discuss various scenarios of family diversity in a number of jurisdictions such as Israel, South Africa, England, Spain, Poland, France, Wales, Botswana, Iran and Bangladesh. There is no apparent link between the * This note is a commentary on some of the viewpoints discussed in Maclean and Eekelaar (eds) Managing Family Justice in Diverse Societies. See also the book review by Rautenbach 2013(16)5 PER 478-487. refers to three models of state regulation of family behaviour, viz. the "authorisation" model, the "delegation" model and the "purposive abstention" model.
The model he prefers is one of "purposive abstention", which means that "moral and social obligations within families are not normally given the force of law unless their failure threatens community interests, or to achieve justice when families fall apart". 4 However, the law of the state would always be relevant and applicable and would nonetheless thus influence family behaviour.
At first glance, it comes as a bit of a surprise that he discusses a fourth model for regulation to which he did not refer in his introduction, viz. "cultural voluntarism".
Upon closer inspection it appears that purposive abstention and cultural voluntarism are interlinked and dependent on each other. Cultural voluntarism allows for a certain measure of group autonomy on a voluntary basis. In this scenario the state stands back and allows individuals within groups considerable freedom to follow their own practices within the private (family) sphere. It thus seems that the purposive model and cultural voluntarism go hand in hand. The only problem with this contention is that it is based on the assumption that group activities are always voluntary and subject to the will of the individual in the group. Although this may be generally true within Western contexts, it is debatable whether it always is the 3 Eekelaar "Law and Community Practices" 15-31. 4 Eekelaar "Law and Community Practices" 16-17. situation. One of the dynamics of African societies, for example, is the role an individual plays within the social structure, which often comes to the fore in the concept uBuntu. 5 The concept in essence refers to group solidarity and the role of the individual within this group. As the survival of the group is dependent on the conduct of the individual, anti-group conduct will generally not be tolerated. Seen this way, the choices of the individual mostly have to give way to social pressure from the group within which he or she operates and "cultural voluntariness", as the author puts it, becomes questionable. A recent case in point saw the banning of women wearing trousers, and thus contravening the local customs of Swaziland, from participating in the local elections.
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I thus have to agree with the critique of Eekelaar's Eurocentric approach as voiced by Prakash Shah. 7 According to him, Eekelaar's preference for the "purposive abstention" vis-à-vis the "cultural voluntarism" model is reflective of the status quo in many jurisdictions. Such a viewpoint gives no recognition to the fact that cultural differences are in need of legal protection and recognition, and also blatantly ignores social realities in Europe and elsewhere.
Alternative Dispute Resolution
The idea that family justice should remain within the personal sphere through the 16 The purpose of the Bill is to extend equality legislation to the operation of arbitration and mediation services, and it is widely believed that its intention is to target services based on Muslim law.
Bano's research reveals that the relationship between Muslim women and some of these tribunals (the unofficial ones and the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal) remains complex and she cautions against the unabridged accommodation of religious laws through these institutions within the British legal system without more research.
As far as I am aware, Muslim institutions in South Africa have not yet considered using arbitration as a mechanism for family or other Muslim-related disputes. It is also doubtful that it could be done. The Arbitration Act 17 prevents the arbitration of "any matrimonial cause or any matter incidental to any such cause" 18 or "any matter relating to status". 19 In the light of the fact that most family disputes involve either matrimonial causes or the status of a family member or a marriage, the Act would in all probability not be helpful in mediating family matters.
Interaction between religious and secular norms
In many jurisdictions the regulation of religious and secular norms in diverse societies is often one of the most difficult things to do. In addition, societies are not divorced from one another and the interaction between religious and secular norms warrants careful consideration by state institutions. This section provides: "If it appears to a court in divorce proceedings that despite the granting of a decree of divorce by the court the spouses or either one of them will, by reason of the prescripts of their religion or the religion of either one of them, not be free to remarry unless the marriage is also dissolved in accordance with such prescripts or unless a barrier to the remarriage of the spouse concerned is removed, the court may refuse to grant a decree of divorce unless the court is satisfied that the spouse within whose power it is to have the marriage so dissolved or the said barrier so removed, has taken all the necessary steps to have the marriage so dissolved or the barrier to the remarriage of the other spouse removed or the court may make any other order that it finds just."
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without also providing a woman with a religious divorce. 25 This is meant to ensure that a woman will automatically be granted a get by her husband, if a secular divorce is granted. This, of course, can also lead to inequity if the man refuses to grant a religious divorce, as this would then prevent a secular divorce as well, and it also does not provide for the situation where the couple was married in terms of religious rites. ... the Court should not be concerned with questions whether, as a matter of religious doctrine, a particular practice is central to the religion. Religion is a matter of faith and belief. The beliefs that believers hold sacred and thus central to their religious faith may strike non-believers as bizarre, illogical or irrational. Human beings may freely believe in what they cannot prove. Yet, that their beliefs are bizarre, illogical or irrational to others or are incapable of scientific proof, does not detract from the fact that these are religious beliefs for the purposes of enjoying the protection guaranteed by the right to freedom of religion. The believers should not be put to the proof of their beliefs or faith. For this reason, it is undesirable for courts to enter into the debate whether a particular practice is central to a religion unless there is a genuine dispute as to the centrality of the practice.
Waheeda Amien
Nevertheless, the problem of definition is not unique to religious marriages. Amien "Gendered Benefits and Costs" 113-114. 35 Maclean "Assessing the Impact of Legislating for and warns that such steps must be taken with caution, because they could easily backfire and negate the good effect the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 has had thus far.
Responses to conflicting rights and freedoms
Time and again two opposing central forces are irreconcilably opposed within the context of human rights. These conflicting interests hold the potential of causing a tug-of-war between rights and values in human rights discourses. One conflict that comes to mind is the right to equality on the one hand and to cultural and religionbased rights on the other. These are two categories of rights which are often incompatible, especially in the case of cultural practices that violate women's rights.
Teresa Picontó-Novales 37 discusses another well-known situation where someone's life, especially that of a minor, is threatened because in the particular scenario she discusses the religious principles of the Jehovah Witnesses prohibit a blood transfusion. 38 The author makes it clear that the conflict between apparent selfsame values and rights such as the right of individuals to exercise their rights and freedoms as they please, the right to life and health, and children's rights, on the one hand, and cultural and religious rights and parental rights on the other, is not easily resolved.
In this particular case the boy died because of his and his parents' refusal to allow a blood transfusion to save his life. The parents were subsequently prosecuted for the offence of homicide by omission but the different opinions reached in the three judicial decisions that followed are a clear indication of the difficulties of the case.
Although the constitutional court eventually found that the parents were not guilty, the author is of the opinion that the state authority's sensitive response to the religious beliefs of the family contributed to the eventual demise of the young boy, The underlying problem in any open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom in which conscientious and religious freedom has to be regarded with appropriate seriousness, is how far such democracy can and must go in allowing members of religious communities to define for themselves which laws they will obey and which not. Such a society can cohere only if all its participants accept that certain basic norms and standards are binding. Accordingly, believers cannot claim an automatic right to be exempted by their beliefs from the laws of the land. At the same time, the State should, wherever reasonably possible, seek to avoid putting believers to extremely painful and intensely burdensome choices of either being true to their faith or else respectful of the law.
If, however, making a choice cannot be prevented, the rights of children are paramount over other rights and freedoms, and -...
[w]hereas parents are free to choose and practise the religion of their choice, such activities can and must be restricted when they are against the child's best interests, without thereby infringing the parents' freedom of religion.
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It is also interesting to note that murder or culpable homicide are both crimes in South African law and that an omission leading to the death of someone might also be enough to lead to the conviction of the omissor. 42 It would be interesting to see if the so-called "cultural defence" could be raised as a defence against a conviction of murder or culpable homicide where the motivation for the crime was based on cultural or religious grounds in a criminal law context. The authors also discuss another practice, namely "elopement", which resembles a "fake kidnapping" to escape the consequences of an arranged marriage by the parents. 46 The practice brings to mind a similar practice in African customary law, namely the ukuthwala custom. In terms of this custom a girl is "abducted" by the prospective husband, his family or his friends with the purpose of the man's marrying her. The custom has led to convictions of abduction, rape and assault in some criminal cases and remains a controversial topic in South African law. Research has shown that the practice has also been abused to force young girls to marry older men, and it is currently under investigation by the South African Law Reform Commission.
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Yasmine Debarge and Benoit Bastard 48 evaluate the situation in France, where historical developments have led to a total aversion against anything (culturally) different. They explain that the Child Access Services is a welfare service operating in a secular state intended to re-establish the relationship between a parent and a child. However, most of the people serviced by these services are from families with different cultural and religious backgrounds, which complicates the parent-child bonding process, especially when culture and religion are ignored.
45
See the discussion of Rautenbach and Matthee 2010 J Legal Plur 109-110. 46 Kurczewski and Fuszara "Cultural Norms, National Laws and Human Rights" 157-160.
For an overview of this custom, see Rautenbach and Matthee 2010 J Legal Plur 118-126. 48 Debarge and Bastard "Child Access Services in France" 169-182.
Non-state responses to cultural diversity
In addition to or apart from governmental actions to "manage" diverse societies, other non-state mechanisms have developed to respond to such demands as diversity brings to the fore.
The first example is the development of religious tribunals assuming a quasi-judicial 54 However, according to Tarryn their divorce was revoked because she and the deceased resumed intimacy after the birth of the child. After the death of the deceased, Tarryn was appointed as the executrix of his estate. Without the knowledge of Tarryn, the deceased's adult daughter obtained an annulment certificate from the Muslim Judicial Council, which she submitted to the Master of the High Court. What followed then was first a letter from the council that she was indeed the wife of the deceased, followed by another letter withdrawing the previous one and confirming that the Talãq was valid. In addition, Tarryn and her children were thrown out of the family home and she had to live on the streets in shelters, whilst her two minor children were taken into state care. Another meeting ensued between the deceased's daughter and the council without Tarryn's knowledge resulted in the issuing of a certificate by the council stating that there had been no reconciliation between Tarryn and the deceased, and again that the Talãq was valid.
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The official website of the council is accessible at http://www.mjc.org.za/. Although the decision of the court is to be welcomed in the light of the protection it afforded to Tarryn, it is envisaged that the comments of the court regarding the status of the Muslim Judicial Council will not go down well with the council and the conservative members of the Muslim community who regard themselves bound by its decisions.
Also dealing with the issue of religious marriages, Jagbir Jhutti-Johal 63 explains how modernity has influenced the development of cultural practices within the Sikh community, especially when a marriage breaks down and issues of mediation and divorce come to the fore. Although certain religions and cultures show resilience against change, the Sikh community has realised that change is inevitable. They are therefore applying a parallel system where they try to mend the broken marriage first through family mediation and, if that does not succeed, they permit the couple to obtain a secular divorce. Private mediation initiatives for families are the norm rather than the exception.
In South Africa this role is fulfilled by unofficial religious and/or secular institutions.
FAMSA (Families South Africa) is an example of a secular non-profit organisation with more than thirty offices across the country. They are engaged in family mediation and are committed to "rendering services to all persons irrespective of race, culture, gender, social-economic background, religion, education, social or political affiliation". 
How much law is enough?
The discussion so far has revealed that legal regulation is not always the answer but needed in some cases. Ribot is well aware of the dangers such an approach might have for individual human rights 79 but he nevertheless proposes a hybrid approach involving both the law and social practices which will not "jeopardise individual self-determination or result in gender-discrimination".
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The similarity between the approach he proposes and that taken in section 31 of the South African Constitution 81 is noticeable. Section 31 provides as follows:
(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community-(a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and (b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society. (2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.
Religious and cultural groups may thus continue with their social practices as long as they do not infringe anyone's rights. Additionally, the wide range of the South In our increasingly diverse societies, it is essential to ensure harmonious interaction among people and groups with plural, varied and dynamic cultural identities as well as their willingness to live together. Policies for the inclusion and participation of all citizens are guarantees of social cohesion, the vitality of civil society and peace. Thus defined, cultural pluralism gives policy expression to the reality of cultural diversity. Indissociable from a democratic framework, cultural pluralism is conducive to cultural exchange and to the flourishing of creative capacities that sustain public life.
This note reviews a couple of responses the law has or should have to families with different "lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs" in a variety of legal systems. It is evident from the discussions that family diversity issues are not unique but are shared by many jurisdictions. The only difference is the way the jurisdictions deal with the issue. the book proposes to do, namely not "to propose a single definite strategy that should be adopted" to deal with family diversity, but to provide "material on which researchers, advocates and policy makers can draw in furthering their understanding of and seeking solutions to the problems raised by this significant social development".
92
Any scholarly publication dealing with cultural and religious diversity contributes to our understanding of the modern-day impact of diversity and the demands such diversity makes on contemporary governments and its people. 
SUMMARY
This contribution deals with the modern-day impact of cultural and religious diversity and comments on some of the viewpoints to be found in Managing Family Justice in Diverse Societies.
1 The topics dealt with in this publication create a greater awareness of the challenges family diversity presents, and illustrate that an attempt to adopt a single definite strategy to manage diversity would not be the right approach; rather that each and every situation should be managed according to its unique context. 
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